Nộp đơn xin việc cũng được tiền

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We study how search frictions (mài xát, ma xát; va chạm, xích mích) in the labor market (thị trường lao động) affect firms’ ability to recruit talented workers (lao động tài năng, tay nghề cao). In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. Estimates from a structural model suggest that the intervention is effective because the cost of making a job application is large, and positively correlated with jobseeker ability. We provide evidence that this positive correlation is driven by dynamic selection. In a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts of application incentives.

That is from a new AER piece by Girum Abebe, A. Stefano Caria, and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina.