Tưởng thế là hay

như tàu cao tốc của tàu, có vẻ quá đỗi hoành tráng,

nhưng có phải ý tưởng hay ko,

giờ đây, lại tàu, chính sách công nghiệp, xuất khẩu nhiều thiết bị y tế, cũng thế thôi...
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trích dẫn hôm nay… is from page 57 of the May 9th, 2020, draft of the important forthcoming monograph from Deirdre McCloskey and Alberto Mingardi, The Illiberal and Anti-Entrepreneurial State of Mariana Mazzucato:

For example, the Chinese system of high-speed trains (hệ thống tàu cao tốc) is a glorious (huy hoàng, rực rỡ, lộng lẫy) State project (dự án nhà nước), which now stretches through (trải dài) the entire immense country (toàn bộ đất nước rộng lớn)—all of the trains raised twenty meters above grade on viaducts (cầu cạn). Stunning (tuyệt vời; lộng lẫy; gây ấn tượng sâu sắc; gây ngạc nhiên, làm choáng váng). But was it a good idea? China, still with an income per head, despite its successes from economic liberalism, only one-fifth or one-fourth that of the United States, has more of such three-hundred-kilometer-per-hour trains than the rest of the world combined. Like the TGV in France, the trains are nice for affluent (giàu có; thịnh vượng) people with a high opportunity cost of personal time (chi phí cơ hội cao về thời gianc cá nhân), and are massively subsidized (trợ cấp lớn) for their benefit. But they reduce income on balance for the rest of the nation.

DBx: Many people who assert that industrial policy has a splendid (nguy nga lộng lẫy, tráng lệ, huy hoàng; rất tốt, tuyệt vời; rất hay, rất đẹp) record of success point to things such as Chinese high-speed trains. Such people do not understand the economic case against industrial policy.

The economic case against industrial policy is not that the state is unable to arrange for some project to be completed or some industry to survive or even to thrive. Of course an agency that can commandeer (trưng dụng cho quân đội) resources (nguồn lực) and obstruct (làm bế tắc, làm nghẽn) people’s commercial choices (lựa chọn thương mại) can build the likes of a high-speed rail system or ensure that steel or computer-chip or soybean producers receive enough revenues to sustain their operations and even to be able to produce outputs that foreigners voluntarily purchase.

What no such agency can do, however, is to know that the uses of resources that it arranges with its tariffs, subsidies, and diktats (lệnh (thường) là vô lý buộc phải tuân theo) are worthwhile (có đáng không). That is, the state cannot possibly know that its industrial-policy ‘successes’ generate satisfaction (thỏa mãn) for consumers (người tiêu dùng) that is at least equal to the satisfaction that would have been generated for consumers had the resources commandeered by the state been instead allocated to whatever uses the market would have directed them. And because these state-ordered allocations of resources are made by suppressing (nín, nén, cầm lại; ngăn cản (một cảm xúc..)) market prices (giá thị trường), the overwhelming likelihood is that even the most impressive-looking industrial-policy ‘success’ is really a failure.

Bài trước: Cần gì phải thế
Tags: economics

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