Journey in Life: china

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Showing posts with label china. Show all posts
Showing posts with label china. Show all posts

Monday, April 5, 2021

Đế quốc bạc

venice và nam tống đi theo 2 con đường khác nhau để tài trợ chiến tranh, nhưng nam tống đi sai đường...
Let’s shift the scene back to 1262, when the two poles of world civilization, Venice in the West

and the Southern Song in the East, both faced the specter of war (bóng ma chiến tranh), and funding for these wars hung by a thread. Almost simultaneously, the authorities of both places came up with plans to deal with their emergencies, both involving the most advanced financial innovations of that time. The Southern Song’s Jia Sidao raised military funding by using the steadily devaluing huizi to buy up public land the strip the populace of wealth. Venice took a different road: Its parliament (quốc hội) authorized the government to mortgage (thế chấp) its tax revenue (tiền thu thuế), and when a fiscal deficit (thâm hụt tài chính) developed, the administration issued government bonds paying interest of 5 percent. In retrospect, Venice’s financial innovation summoned the magic power of public debt as capital and effectively led Europe into an era of financial revolution. As for china, the excessively issued huizi did not regain the favor of the market; rather, public discontent and unrest threw open the door for invasion by the Mongolians.

…we witness China taking the lead on finance and currency, but in the wrong direction. China, at a very early stage, had “flying money” (feiqian) for remitting funds, as well as pawnshops, silver shops, and other such establishments for credit transfer; the Song dynasty’s paper currency originated in private institutions; and private local banks (qianzhuang) and money-exchange shops (piaohao) experienced extraordinary growth in the Ming and Qing dynasties. So why didn’t China produce a modern banking industry?

…The unbankability of China’s currency led to the failure of China’s paper currency system and forced it to take the silver route. Without banks, and without the coinage of silver, progressing from bank notes to paper currency was out of the question. Currency could only exist in the form of confusing and outmoded metage currency.

Xấu hổ quá

vườn thú china xấu hổ vì định dùng chó thay sư tử... :)

In a video clip that circulated widely on social media this week, a man only identified by his surname Tang, took his child to visit Yuanjiashan Zoo in Xichang, Sichuan, on Saturday but was startled when they found a golden retriever in the African lion enclosure, despite signage introducing the animal as a feline.

“At first, we thought we had gone to the wrong place. But after walking around the cage, we realised it is where the lion should be housed,” Tang said in the video.

Friday, March 12, 2021

Từ 2021, quấy rối tình dục nơi công sở nhận cái kết đắng

thanh niên thượng hải nhắn tin khiếm nhã tới đồng nghiệp bị tòa ra án phạt 345 triệu đồng...
A Shanghai court (tòa án) ruled (phán quyết) Monday that a man’s persistent (dai dẳng, liên tục) inappropriate (không phù hợp) language toward his colleague (đồng nghiệp) constituted sexual harassment (quấy rối tình dục), the city’s first such judicial decision under China’s new civil code.

The Yangpu District People’s Court said the defendant (bị đơn) should pay at least 98,000 yuan ($15,000) in compensation (bồi thường) to the plaintiff (nguyên đơn) for medical bills, lost wages, transportation expenses, legal fees, and mental distress (nỗi đau buồn, đau đớn).

...Wang Li and Xu Qiang worked in the same department at an unidentified company. Beginning in August 2019, the defendant sent the plaintiff obscene (tục tĩu) and disturbing (quấy rầy, quấy rối) text messages — some referencing rape (hiếp dâm) and suicide (tự sát) — on an almost daily basis.

Không dễ đâu

nhiều hãng đi chung xe của china (gofun...) rồi cũng sắp phá sản thôi...
Chinese car-sharing platform (nền tảng chia sẻ xe oto) GoFun, which once attracted investment from Volkswagen, has quietly withdrawn from many cities due to a failing revenue model (mô hình doanh thu) shared by the country’s once-surging bike-sharing industry.

...“The car-sharing industry is likely to become the next bike-sharing industry,” the source said, referring to the swift rise and fall of China’s shared-bike companies. “The profit model is not sound, capital investment enthusiasm is gone, and the sector has entered a vicious cycle (vòng luẩn quẩn). There’s a mess waiting at the end.”

There are still almost 120 car-sharing platforms operating in China, although many have reportedly been dealing with cash squeezes since last year. The number of domestic operators used to be as high as 300.

...The business model of high investment and low prices is unbalanced (không cân bằng), an industry insider said. On a good day, GoFun earns about 60 yuan ($9.20) per car and as little as 30 yuan during the low season, the person added — but earnings should be above 120 yuan to make a profit.

Vậy cũng làm được

dân china đua nhau ly hôn giả để mua nhà thứ 3...
...Wu and her husband are among those caught by the sudden clampdown (chính sách khẩn cấp). As in other major cities, their hometown of Shanghai only permits each household to buy two homes — one of many restrictions (hạn chế) imposed (áp đặt) over recent years to control property prices (kiểm soát giá bất động sản). But many families found it was possible to acquire a third home through a carefully planned divorce.

Though Wu and her partner already owned two apartments, both were registered under the husband’s name (đứng tên chồng). As a result, Wu technically wouldn’t own any property once she became single, meaning she’d be free to buy an apartment of her own.

Tactical divorces (ly dị chiến thuật) of this kind are frowned upon in China, but they’ve become a useful tool for households looking to exploit (khai thác, tận dụng) local policy loopholes (lỗ hổng chính sách). In one extreme case, a family in the eastern Zhejiang province was found to have separated and remarried 23 times in one month (ly hôn rồi lại tái hôn tới 23 lần trong một tháng) to claim higher compensation payments during a resettlement project (dự án tái định cư).

...“We’re all very optimistic that property prices in this area will continue to grow,” says Wu. “A divorce is the most efficient way to get to our (investment) goal.”

Bài trước: Giờ mới ngộ à?

Thursday, March 11, 2021

Giờ mới ngộ à?

từng mỉa mai, chế giễu, giờ đây ấn độ, mỹ và phương tây đang học theo và áp dụng mô hình vạn lý tường lửa (Phòng hỏa trường thành) của china...
The internet was once viewed as a utopia (xã hội không tưởng) where everyone was free to say whatever they liked, with only 'bad' countries regulating what was uploaded. Yet now from New Delhi to New York, leaders seem to be following Beijing's lead.

In the words of CNN, “India is building its own internet” or, more accurately, its own nationally focused applications and social media ecosystem. There’s a myriad of reasons as to why. First of all, following clashes between government forces and protesting farmers over the past few months, Indian authorities have increasingly clashed with American social media giants such as Facebook and Twitter, demanding they censor activist accounts on their networks. The government ended up shutting down the internet entirely in certain areas to try and curb the unrest (náo động). Then secondly, the border skirmish (đụng độ quân sự ở biên giới) with China has also seen India ban hundreds of Chinese apps, including the international sensation TikTok.

Irrespective of the target country, the motivations are the same: India wants national sovereignty (chủ quyền quốc gia) over its internet. Just such a position is held, somewhat ironically (nghịch lý, ngược đời), by Beijing itself, which has previously called it “cyber sovereignty" (chủ quyền không gian mạng)– the idea that the internet within a certain country is not a liberal-free-for-all Wild West, as many have previously understood it, but is in fact subject to national laws (luật pháp quốc gia) and sovereignty. This has usually been associated with authoritarianism (chủ nghĩa độc tài) and censorship (kiểm duyệt); hence its creation by China. However, as we can see by India’s embrace of the concept, the world’s attitude to the internet is changing. As geopolitics (địa chính trị) reconfigures itself and aspects of ‘globalization’ come under scrutiny, the dream of the internet as a libertarian ideal is closing down not just in the East, but in the West too.

...Yet, in 2021, the concept of ‘national sovereignty’ over the internet is expanding from what was once condemned as an authoritarian idea into something widely used and supported. This sea-change in attitude can be pinned down to a single year: 2016. This was the year that populism and anti-globalization, most famously exemplified by Brexit and Trump, broke into the mainstream and revealed to the Western political class that the internet and social media were not a linear force of one-way enlightenment. The reality was far more anarchic and provided the chance for ‘false’ ideas and ‘misinformation’ to be propagated on an industrial scale, as well as to give power to political movements that could challenge the ruling establishments that had previously been able to be kept at bay.

The internet represents openness, but that openness was always in fact conditional on political security and confidence, as opposed to an ideological matter of principle. In reality it was never really as simple as “bad countries hiding the truth”, as it was fear of the internet’s ramifications (phân nhánh). China understood that first, and now the West’s sense of confidence and security about the free internet is also evaporating.

Saturday, March 6, 2021

Hội 'rich kid' biến đi

'khoe giàu', 'khoe của' sẽ bị khóa tài khoản ở tiktok... ;)
In a notice (thông báo) Friday, Douyin — as the enormously (khổng lồ) popular short-video app is branded in China — said six kinds of content including “flaunting (khoe khoang, phô trương) wealth (sự giàu có)” are now banned (bị cấm) on the platform (nền tảng) because they promote “unhealthy values.” (giá trị không lành mạnh)

The content prohibitions follow the introduction (áp dụng) of livestreaming regulations that highlighted wealth-flaunting as an issue last year, as well as the government’s recent call to spread more “positive energy” (truyền tải năng lượng tích cực) online.

The six similar categories identified by Douyin also include promoting money-worship, using minors in videos related to luxury products, and “showing off (khoe khoang, khoác lác) one’s social status (địa vị xã hội) in an inappropriate (không phù hợp) way,” which includes “making fun of the poor.” (chế nhạo người nghèo)

Fabricating (bịa đặt, làm giả) narratives (câu chuyện, giai thoại) — ascending from rags to riches ("tay trắng làm nên") or having just returned from studying abroad (vừa du học về), for example — in order to market products or scam (lừa đảo) users makes up another banned category.

Nhớ rửa kỹ trước khi dùng nhé

sản phẩm "giỏ hoa quả truyền thống" (có thể để đựng hoa quả, ngâm rượu) của china bày bán trên amazon (giá gấp 10 lần), thực ra là 'ống nhổ' :)
If you thought the “1960s Chinese traditional fruit basket” selling for C$68.45 (S$72) on Amazon did not look appropriate (trông không hợp) for the dinner table (bàn ăn), you would be right.

Similar spittoons are selling on Chinese e-commerce platform Taobao for just 28 yuan (S$5.70).

The enamel (tráng men, phủ men) product adorned with a pair of mandarin ducks and the Chinese words symbolising "double happiness" (song hỉ) in red was advertised on Amazon as being a Chinese antique (đồ cổ, nghệ thuật cổ) with a wide range of uses, from being a vegetable and fruit holder to an ice bucket, or a decorative (để trang hoàng, để trang trí) display stand.

It was also recommended as a good gift for housewarmings and weddings, with photos showing it being used to store French loaves, as well as to hold a bottle of wine in ice, placed classily beside a champagne glass on a wooden table.

The listing described the item as an antique Chinese fruit basket with "beautiful colours and patterns" that represent "traditional Chinese culture" and "symbolise the happiness of life". Its "large storage space can store any fruit", it added.

Sunday, February 28, 2021

Không chơi thế đâu nhé

bộ ngoại giao mỹ phản đối vì china yêu cầu các nhà ngoại giao Mỹ lấy mẫu xét nghiệm Covid-19 từ hậu môn... :D

“The State Department never agreed to this kind of testing and protested (phản đối) directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when we learned that some staff were subject to it,” a State Department spokesperson told VICE World News on Wednesday.

The spokesperson said Beijing had assured Washington that the test was given “in error” (nhầm, lỗi) and that diplomatic personnel were exempt (miễn) from the test, which was mandatory (bắt buộc) for incoming travelers in some parts of China.

“We have instructed staff to decline this test if it is asked of them, as was done in the past.”

Saturday, February 27, 2021

Mỹ tái cấu trúc chuỗi cung ứng?

Tổng thống Mỹ Joe Biden ký sắc lệnh xem xét lại các chuỗi cung ứng để Mỹ và các đồng minh không còn bị lúng túng vì tùy thuộc quá nhiều vào bên ngoài. Biden ra lệnh làm hai cuộc đánh giá:

1. Trong 100 ngày tới, đánh giá các điểm yếu trong 4 chuỗi cung ứng: hoạt chất dược phẩm, khoáng sản tối quan trọng, chất bán dẫn và bao bì tối tân, và pin dung lượng lớn.

2. Trong 1 năm tới, đánh giá sâu rộng hơn về nhiều địa hạt khác. (hat tip to nhã hoàng)
Today President Biden will sign an Executive Order (sắc lệnh hành pháp) to help create more resilient (mau phục hồi, kiên cường) and secure supply chains for critical and essential goods.

In recent years, American households, workers, and companies have increasingly felt the strain (căng thẳng) of shortages (thiếu thốn) of essential products (sản phẩm thiết yếu)—from medicine to food to computer chips. Last year’s shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) for front-line healthcare workers (nhân viên y tế tuyến đầu) at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (đại dịch) were unacceptable (không chấp nhận được). Recent shortages of automotive semiconductor chips have forced slowdowns at car manufacturing plants, highlighting how shortages can hurt U.S. workers.

While we cannot predict (dự đoán, tiên đoán) what crisis (khủng hoảng) will hit us, we should have the capacity (năng lực) to respond (phản ứng, đối phó) quickly in the face of challenges (đối mặt với thách thức). The United States must ensure that production shortages, trade disruptions (đứt gãy thương mại), natural disasters (thảm họa thiên nhiên) and potential actions by foreign competitors (đối thủ nước ngoài) and adversaries (địch thủ) never leave the United States vulnerable (dễ bị tổn thương) again. Today’s action delivers on the President’s campaign commitment to direct his Administration to comprehensively address (giải quyết một cách toàn diện) supply chain risks (rủi ro chuỗi cung ứng). The task of making our supply chains more secure can also be a source of well paid jobs for communities across our country, including in communities of color, and steps will be taken to ensure that the benefits of this work flow to all Americans.

The Executive Order launches a comprehensive review of U.S. supply chains and directs federal Departments and Agencies to identify ways to secure U.S. supply chains against a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities. Building resilient supply chains will protect the United States from facing shortages of critical products. It will also facilitate needed investments to maintain America’s competitive edge (lợi thế cạnh tranh), and strengthen U.S. national security (an ninh quốc gia).

Bạn muốn hẹn hò

thì cố gắng học và tốt nghiệp trường xịn nhé,

học trường kém là nền tảng/ứng dụng hẹn hò mới HIMMR (sáng lập bởi 2 cựu sinh viên đại học thanh hoa, china) loại ngay từ vòng gửi xe đấy...

Though Yi attended a respectable (đáng trọng; đáng kính; đứng đắn) college (trường cao đẳng), most of his prospective (tương lai, về sau, sắp tới) partners graduated (tốt nghiệp) from the prestigious (có uy tín, có thanh thế; đem lại uy tín, đem lại thanh thế) Project 985 group of elite (ưu tú, tinh hoa) Chinese universities. And in today’s China, that distinction (sự khác biệt/tương phản, nét đặc biệt/độc đáo, sự xuất chúng/lỗi lạc) means everything.

“I feel a distance from many on the platform (nền tảng),” says Yi, who gave only his surname for privacy reasons. “They’re out of my league.”

On HIMMR, snap judgments based on a person’s college diploma are par for the course. The dating platform has found success by tapping into a growing tendency in China to view an individual’s alma mater (trường đại học) — rather than their appearance (bề ngoài), personality (tính cách), or career (công việc) — as the ultimate indicator of their value.

HIMMR — an acronym for How I Met Mr. Right — was founded by two alumni of Tsinghua University (đại học thanh hoa), Beijing’s top-ranked college, in 2015. From the beginning, it has marketed itself as an exclusive (dành riêng) club for elite graduates, arguing that pairing users by educational background (nền tảng học vấn) is the most “authentic, high-quality, and efficient” way to foster (chăm sóc và nuôi dưỡng, giúp cho sự trưởng thành/phát triển)  long-term romantic relationships (mối quan hệ lãng mạn lâu dài).

Only students from Project 985 schools and a select group of overseas institutions are allowed to set up accounts on HIMMR — a policy the platform rigidly enforces. New users have to submit all their higher education certificates before creating an account, while those who studied abroad must have their diplomas verified by China’s Ministry of Education.

Phụ nữ công sở - hãy luôn làm mình đẹp hơn

có thể mặc 'xu chiêng giúp thăng tiến' nhé ;)

nghệ sĩ hài li dan của china đã phải xin lỗi vì quảng cáo như vậy...

On Wednesday, Li posted a promotion (quảng cáo) for the bestselling (bán chạy nhất) Beijing-based bra (áo ngực, xu chiêng) brand Ubras to his Weibo microblog. In it, he claims the product can “help a woman easily ‘win lying down’ in the workplace.”

The Chinese slang term (tiếng lóng) “win lying down” means to secure victory even after contributing little (giành chiến thắng mà ko tốn mấy công sức). But in this context, it suggests that women rely on their sex appeal (hấp dẫn tình dục) to boost their careers (thúc đẩy sự nghiệp).

Li’s post immediately (ngay lập tức) drew a barrage of criticism from Weibo users, many of whom said it hinted (ngụ ý, bóng gió) at stereotypes of women as less professionally capable, contributed to social pressure on women to look a certain way, and made light of the serious issue of sexual harassment (quấy rối tình dục).

Bài trước: Trời không dung

Friday, February 26, 2021

Anh em chú ý, cơ hội lần hai

giờ biết giá rồi nhé,

tòa án china xử ly hôn, định giá 5 năm làm việc nhà của vợ là... 50.000 tệ (178 triệu đồng) ;)

...the plaintiff (nguyên đơn, người đứng kiện), surnamed (họ) Wang, had filed for divorce (nộp đơn ly dị) from her husband, surnamed Chen, last year. She said her husband “didn’t care about or participate in any kind of chores around the house,” and would go to work each day, leaving her at home to care for their child. Beijing’s Fangshan District court ruled in her favor, ordering Chen to cough up 50,000 yuan ($7,700) for neglecting his share of the domestic duties.

“The division of a couple’s joint property after marriage typically entails (bao gồm) divvying up tangible property (tài sản hữu hình). But housework may constitute intangible property value (giá trị tài sản vô hình) … not reflected among their physical assets,” the presiding judge, Feng Miao, told domestic media (truyền thông nội địa) on Monday. The case is now awaiting appeal (kháng cáo), though it’s unclear which side objected to the verdict (lời tuyên án, phán quyết).

Saturday, February 13, 2021

Thoát Âu sang Á

shared from fb archivu,

Thời Minh Trị, khẩu hiệu “thoát Á sang Âu” là kim chỉ nam của người Nhật, là con đường đưa Nhật Bản thành một quốc thịnh vượng và hiện đại. Giờ đây, London dường như đang đi theo hướng ngược lại “thoát Âu sang Á”. 

Sau khi rời EU, UK đã chuyển hướng sang châu Á, đặc biệt là quan hệ bền chặt hơn với Tokyo. TQ đang tỏ ra lo lắng trước cái gọi là “quasi-alliance” giữa Anh và Nhật, khi trong mắt TQ họ hồi tưởng lại liên minh Anh-Nhật từ năm 1902, đã thay đổi châu Á, liên minh tan rã năm 1923 do mối đe doạ từ Nga. 

Quan hệ Anh-Trung đang xấu đi nhanh chóng, truyền thông Anh mới đây đã thu hồi giấy phép hoạt động của kênh truyền hình CGTN với lý do kênh này thuộc quyền kiểm soát của ĐCSTQ. 

Khi Mỹ đang giải quyết những vấn đề nội địa chưa tái nhập TPP, TQ đang xúc tiến xin gia nhập, thì với việc UK nộp đơn và nếu được tham gia TPP trước và xây dựng được một sự đồng thuận ngăn TQ gia nhập thì Bắc Kinh sẽ mất cơ hội vàng để “bành trướng” thương mại trong khu vực. 
Làn sóng Brexit đang “tấn công” bờ biển Trung Hoa. 
Britain’s broadcasting regulator said on Thursday that it had withdrawn the license for China Global Television Network, an international news channel owned by a Chinese state broadcaster, to operate in the United Kingdom in part because its affiliation (mối quan hệ hình thành bằng cách nhận làm chi nhánh) with the Chinese Communist Party violates broadcasting laws.

License holders must have editorial (biên tập) oversight over their content (giám sát nội dung) and cannot be controlled by political bodies (cơ quan chính trị), and the regulator, Ofcom, said the outlet had failed on both counts.

The revocation is likely to heighten tensions (gia tăng căng thẳng) between Britain and China, which have already been strained (trạng thái căng thẳng) over Britain’s decisions (quyết định) to suspend (đình chỉ, hoãn, tạm ngưng) an extradition treaty (hiệp ước dẫn độ) with Hong Kong and grant visas to potentially millions of Hong Kongers after Beijing imposed (áp đặt) a security law to crack down on (đàn áp) dissent (bất đồng chính kiến) in the former British colony.

Saturday, January 30, 2021

Không ổn rồi

công ty công nghệ sinh học lớn nhất thế giới - tập đoàn bgi (liên quan tới quân đội china) tranh thủ cơ hội covid-19 để thu thập dna mọi người, nhằm chiến thắng trong cuộc đua kiểm soát dữ liệu sinh học toàn thế giới...
The largest biotech firm (công ty công nghệ sinh học) in the world wasted no time (không lãng phí thời gian, không chậm trễ) in offering to build and run COVID testing labs (phòng xét nghiệm covid) in Washington, contacting its governor (thống đốc, chủ tịch tỉnh) right after the first major COVID outbreak in the U.S. occurred there. The Chinese company, the BGI Group, made the same offer to at least five other states, including New York and California, 60 Minutes has learned.

This, along with other COVID testing offers by BGI, so worried Bill Evanina, then the country's top counterintelligence officer (sĩ quan phản gián), that he authorized a rare public warning. "Foreign powers can collect, store and exploit biometric information from COVID tests" declared the notice. Evanina believes the Chinese are trying to collect Americans' DNA to win a race to control the world's biodata.

...Thanks partially to Evanina's efforts, none of the states accepted the offer of the BGI Group, which he says has close ties to China's military and ruling Communist Party. "This shows the nefarious (hung ác, bất chính) mindset of the Communist Party of China, to take advantage of a worldwide crisis like COVID," says Evanina. A veteran of the FBI and the CIA, he recently stepped down, but not before sounding the alarm. "We put out an advisory to not only every American, but to hospitals, associations, and clinics (phòng khám). Knowing that BGI is a Chinese company, do we understand where that data's going?"

Đọc "Về Trung Quốc" của Kissinger

đọc làm gì, sai bét rồi :D

...Roy asserted (khẳng định), for example, that “The breakthrough to China … really was a turning point (bước ngoặt) in the Cold War,” inducing (xui khiến, thuyết phục) Moscow to enter Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Hiệp định tạm thời về một số biện pháp trong lĩnh vực hạn chế vũ khí chiến lược), and that “SALT paved the way to détente (hòa hoãn) that ultimately (cuối cùng, rốt cuộc) … brought down (hạ xuống, làm tụt xuống; hạ bệ, làm nhục; hạ, bắn rơi) the Soviet Union.”

In fact, however, the détente period brought heightened Cold War tensions (căng thẳng chiến tranh lạnh), Soviet global advances, and a near-nuclear confrontation (đối đầu hạt nhân) during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It was Ronald Reagan who confronted (đối đầu, đối chất) “the Evil Empire” (đế quốc ma quỷ) a decade later, turned that momentum around and caused a Soviet downfall that Vladimir Putin has described as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” (thảm họa địa chính trị lớn nhất của thế kỷ)

Roy’s claim about Kissinger’s second great China-related achievement — Vietnam — is even more astonishing (đáng ngạc nhiên): “They negotiated an end to the Vietnam war that, in retrospect (ngẫm lại), [is] looked at as a disastrous end. But ... the agreement that was reached in 1973 was on U.S. terms because the key Vietnamese demand throughout the negotiation had been that there could only be an agreement if we got rid of (loại bỏ) the South Vietnamese government (chính phủ vnch). And the U.S. side would not cave in (nhượng bộ, chịu thua, khuất phục) on that subject.”

How does Roy explain the disaster (thảm họa) that followed? “Agreements cannot be implemented effectively (thực thi hiệu quả) if you don’t have the domestic support (ủng hộ trong nước) for doing that.”

Did Kissinger just learn that elemental diplomatic lesson (bài học ngoại giao cơ bản) after Saigon collapsed (sụp đổ) under North Vietnam’s inevitable full-scale invasion (xâm lược)? Or, as a seasoned realist and erudite (uyên bác, thông thái) historian (nhà sử học), didn’t he already know it at the time and sign South Vietnam’s death warrant (ký lệnh xử tử) anyway?

...Nixon’s strategic vision (tầm nhìn chiến lược) was that “China must change,” and he regretted years later that it had only grown more powerful: “We may have created a Frankenstein[’s monster].” Contrary to Kissinger mythology (huyền thoại), his vision was not strategic but transactional — our concessions to China would temper Soviet hostility and give us a “graceful exit” from both South Vietnam and Taiwan. That it failed on all counts is of no great concern to Kissinger; there would be other transactions with China over the ensuing decades.

Những lưu ý khi đi lễ người công giáo cần nhớ

cạnh nhà thờ luôn có đồn cảnh sát gần đó đấy (nghiên cứu ở china) ;)

How do authoritarian states organize their coercive (ép buộc, cưỡng bức) institutions over space? We argue that autocrats maximize the utility of their limited coercive resources by clustering them with perceived threats in society, i.e., segments of the population that are ideologically distant and have mobilizational potential. We test this proposition using a dataset that covers the universe of police stations (N = 147,428) and religious sites (N = 115,394) in China. We find that police stations are more likely to be located within walking distance of foreign religious sites (churches) than other sites (temples), even after controlling for the estimated population within 1 km of each site and a set of key site attributes. This finding is robust to using alternative model specifications, different variable measurements, and multiple data sources. Moving beyond the clustering pattern, we also address the temporal order issue and show that the Chinese state has allocated more new coercive resources around existing foreign religious sites than native sites, i.e., after these sites are already in place. This study enriches our understanding of how autocrats rule and further opens up an emerging new methodological avenue for research on authoritarian politics.

Người lái buôn thành Venice

sẽ toàn thương nhân người hoa thôi :)

ký biên bản ghi nhớ để cải thiện toàn diện năng lực hai cảng biển, trong kế hoạch 'một vành đai một con đường' của china...
Pino Musolino, president of the Port Authority of Venice, told: “Venice port has long worked to seize the opportunities (nắm bắt cơ hội) that China’s New Silk Roads (con đường tơ lụa mới) strategy (chiến lược) offers, with the aim of having positive spillovers on local business and job levels.”

On February 11, Venice signed a memo of understanding with Piraeus to improve overall capacities of the two seaports as important hubs in the Belt and Road (nhất đới nhất lộ) scheme. The two port facilities had already set up a weekly ferry service (dịch vụ phà hằng tuần) last October. Venice port also has a new rail link to Duisburg, in western Germany, which is the European hub for the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt.

“In regard with the dualism between Venice and Trieste, the two ports actually service different markets,” Musolino emphasised.

“Our facility is the main gateway to industrial clusters in northern Italy, importing raw materials and exporting high-added-value products. For its part, Trieste is focused on Central and Eastern Europe.”

Musolino believes North Adriatic ports should combine their efforts to better manage increased Mediterranean trade resulting from the Belt and Road plan.

Nghề bán thuốc tây có phù hợp với bạn?

bán dược phẩm là nhẹ nhàng rồi,

thử bán tampon (nút vệ sinh) ở china xem, cực khó luôn, vì phụ nữ ở đây cho rằng đút tampon vào sẽ... làm thủng màng trinh :D

năm 1989, cty mỹ tampax thâm nhập thị trường china rồi lại rút lui, năm 2017, ba thập kỷ sau, vẫn còn khó khăn "hướng dẫn người tiêu dùng" về sản phẩm...
Why don’t more Chinese women use tampons (nút bông, len hoặc vải thấm nước đặt vào âm hộ phụ nữ để thấm máu khi có kinh; nút vệ sinh)? So-called period poverty (thiếu tiền mua băng vệ sinh) is one reason — with the price of a single tampon usually being two to five times higher than that of a sanitary pad (băng vệ sinh) — but it’s not the only one.

...Some women reported that, even though they weren’t against the idea of tampons, they’ve experienced practical difficulties using them. For example, one respondent didn't understand her own anatomy (giải phẫu học) well enough to use them, writing, “I couldn’t find the entrance (on my body).” Another wrote, “My hands were covered in blood (máu), and I couldn’t insert it, no matter what I did.” In the end, they both gave up. A third woman reported going through 10 tampons before getting it right.

Sociocultural taboos (cấm kỵ văn hóa xã hội) toward sex are another barrier for tampon use. A significant number of female survey respondents expressed concern about whether using a tampon would break their hymen (xử nữ mạc, màng trinh). “My boyfriend (bạn trai) thinks tampons infringe on his territory (xâm nhập lãnh thổ), and he finds that unacceptable,” wrote another. These responses suggest that women still don’t have full control over what they insert into their vaginas — they have to consider other people’s reactions.

Chính thức mất Tết

china cấm hàng triệu người về quê ăn tết...

In a regular year, hundreds of millions of people travel by plane, train and car to be with their families for the Lunar New Year, which begins Feb. 12.

This year, the authorities (chính quyền, cơ quan có thẩm quyền) imposed (áp đặt, buộc ai phải chấp nhận điều gì) onerous (nặng nề, khó nhọc, phiền hà) quarantine (cách ly) and testing (xét nghiệm) rules to dissuade (khuyên can, can ngăn) roughly 300 million migrant (nhập cư, di cư) workers from traveling home. People returning to rural areas during the holiday must spend two weeks in quarantine (cách ly 2 tuần) and pay for their own coronavirus tests (trả chi phí xét nghiệm). Many migrants, who work at low-paying jobs, say the restrictions make it impossible to travel.

The tightened rules have drawn criticism, with many calling the approach unfair to the workers, who have already been among the most affected by the pandemic (đại dịch). The holiday is normally the only time that many of them can return to their hometowns.

Incentives: With gift baskets and discounts, access to better schools and health care, the government is trying to entice (dụ dỗ) migrant workers to stay in the cities and prevent the kind of spread that would require new lockdowns (phong tỏa).

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