Trận Mậu Thân có thực sự là một bất ngờ?

Vấn đề còn lớn hơn cả chuyện của Peers và Westmoreland; tám năm sau, sai lầm tương tự đã xảy ra với sự sụp đổ của Sài Gòn. 

-----

...Throughout September and October 1967, my military counterparts (đồng sự) and I kept close track of the communications (theo dõi chặt chẽ mọi thông tin liên lạc) of the B3 Front (Mặt trận B3), the senior North Vietnamese headquarters for the highlands (trụ sở cấp cao của Bắc Việt ở Tây Nguyên); its subordinate 1st Division (Phân khu 1 trực thuộc); and two independent regiments (hai trung đoàn độc lập), the 24th and the 33rd. Over those months we followed the B3 Front as it deployed a forward command post that established communications with Hanoi — always a sign of impending combat (luôn là dấu hiệu của một trận chiến sắp xảy ra). Soon it was exchanging a large volume of messages with North Vietnam, mostly sent at night when Vietnamese Communist transmitters normally shut down. The command post and the 24th Regiment moved quickly to Kontum Province. The 33rd Regiment, two provinces to the south in Darlac, initiated combat communications. A new unit, not yet identified, showed up in Pleiku Province, close to our location.

In other words, it looked like the enemy was preparing a highlands-wide offensive.

...We informed the American 4th Infantry Division and the 173rd Brigade that an attack on the Dak To area would very likely begin between Oct. 30 and Nov. 4, dates we learned from the reconnaissance unit’s messages. But we also warned that units throughout the highlands were preparing for combat. This, we said, was going to be big.

At this point we hit an unexpected obstacle (trở ngại bất ngờ): credibility (sự tín nhiệm). 

Bài trước: Nixon hứa gì với Nguyễn Văn Thiệu?