Đọc "Về Trung Quốc" của Kissinger

đọc làm gì, sai bét rồi :D
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...Roy asserted (khẳng định), for example, that “The breakthrough to China … really was a turning point (bước ngoặt) in the Cold War,” inducing (xui khiến, thuyết phục) Moscow to enter Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Hiệp định tạm thời về một số biện pháp trong lĩnh vực hạn chế vũ khí chiến lược), and that “SALT paved the way to détente (hòa hoãn) that ultimately (cuối cùng, rốt cuộc) … brought down (hạ xuống, làm tụt xuống; hạ bệ, làm nhục; hạ, bắn rơi) the Soviet Union.”

In fact, however, the détente period brought heightened Cold War tensions (căng thẳng chiến tranh lạnh), Soviet global advances, and a near-nuclear confrontation (đối đầu hạt nhân) during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It was Ronald Reagan who confronted (đối đầu, đối chất) “the Evil Empire” (đế quốc ma quỷ) a decade later, turned that momentum around and caused a Soviet downfall that Vladimir Putin has described as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” (thảm họa địa chính trị lớn nhất của thế kỷ)

Roy’s claim about Kissinger’s second great China-related achievement — Vietnam — is even more astonishing (đáng ngạc nhiên): “They negotiated an end to the Vietnam war that, in retrospect (ngẫm lại), [is] looked at as a disastrous end. But ... the agreement that was reached in 1973 was on U.S. terms because the key Vietnamese demand throughout the negotiation had been that there could only be an agreement if we got rid of (loại bỏ) the South Vietnamese government (chính phủ vnch). And the U.S. side would not cave in (nhượng bộ, chịu thua, khuất phục) on that subject.”

How does Roy explain the disaster (thảm họa) that followed? “Agreements cannot be implemented effectively (thực thi hiệu quả) if you don’t have the domestic support (ủng hộ trong nước) for doing that.”

Did Kissinger just learn that elemental diplomatic lesson (bài học ngoại giao cơ bản) after Saigon collapsed (sụp đổ) under North Vietnam’s inevitable full-scale invasion (xâm lược)? Or, as a seasoned realist and erudite (uyên bác, thông thái) historian (nhà sử học), didn’t he already know it at the time and sign South Vietnam’s death warrant (ký lệnh xử tử) anyway?

...Nixon’s strategic vision (tầm nhìn chiến lược) was that “China must change,” and he regretted years later that it had only grown more powerful: “We may have created a Frankenstein[’s monster].” Contrary to Kissinger mythology (huyền thoại), his vision was not strategic but transactional — our concessions to China would temper Soviet hostility and give us a “graceful exit” from both South Vietnam and Taiwan. That it failed on all counts is of no great concern to Kissinger; there would be other transactions with China over the ensuing decades.

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