Hết hạn sao chưa dỡ phong tỏa?

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In my most-recent column for AIER, I riff on the reality of government officials’ perverse incentives in the face of their own mistakes. A slice:

Ironically (nghịch lý thay), the bigger the public policy error (sai lầm chính sách công), the more reluctant (lưỡng lự) politicians (chính trị gia) become to admit (thừa nhận)
making a mistake and reversing course (đảo ngược). If the Covid lockdowns (phong tỏa) had destroyed only a handful of jobs, inflicted only a tiny bit of inconvenience, and cost just a few million dollars in taxpayer funds, then admitting error by reversing course would be to admit to having been responsible for imposing on society only a small cost. Voters might well forgive such a minor faux pas.

But because the lockdowns caused enormous damage – physical, economic, and emotional – to admit error by reversing course would be to confess to having caused a calamity. And no politician wants to admit to having caused a calamity (tai họa, tai ương, thiên tai).

So largely because lockdowns and other public policy responses were so calamitous, the politicians and bureaucrats who supported these responses have no incentive to admit the error of their ways. And because reversing course would be such an admission, no reversals occur. Lockdowns and other restrictions might be allowed to die according to their preannounced dates, but not before. Further, when in the future there arise threats similar to the one that sparked the lockdowns, officials who supported the original lockdowns will feel strong pressure to support renewed lockdowns. If they don’t, they risk admitting to the public that their earlier decision – one that was extraordinarily costly – was a terrible mistake.

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