Nga thua thì sao?

nước Nga bị suy yếu, sỉ nhục -> dồn nén những cảm xúc phục thù như Đức sau Thế chiến 1, một chế độ độc tài sở hữu vũ khí hạt nhân (chứ ko phải nền dân chủ thân phương Tây)

châu Âu sẽ phải giữ Nga ở thế yếu, giữ Mỹ ở lại cùng,

Mỹ muốn tập trung vào china, còn china tăng ảnh hưởng đối với Nga đang suy yếu

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The consequences (hậu quả) of a Russian loss in Ukraine would present Europe and the United States with fundamental challenges (thách thức mang tính nền tảng). Assuming Russia will be forced to withdraw one day, rebuilding Ukraine, with the political goal (mục tiêu chính trị) of welcoming it into the EU and NATO, will be a task of Herculean proportions (nhiệm vụ nặng nề). And the West must not fail Ukraine again. Alternatively, a weak form of Russian control over Ukraine could mean a fractured (rạn nứt), destabilized (bất ổn) area of continuous fighting (giao tranh liên tục) with limited or no governance structures just east of NATO’s border. The humanitarian catastrophe (thảm họa nhân đạo) would be unlike anything Europe has seen in decades.

No less worrisome (đáng lo ngại ko kém) is the prospect (viễn cảnh) of a weakened and humiliated (bị sỉ nhục) Russia, harboring  (âm thầm dồn nén) revanchist impulses (cảm xúc phục thù) akin to those that festered in Germany after World War I. If Putin maintains his grip on power (duy trì quyền lực), Russia will become a pariah state (quốc gia bị bài xích), a rogue superpower (siêu cường bất hảo) with a chastened (bị uốn nắn, trừng phạt, trừng trị; chế ngự, kiềm chế) conventional military but with its nuclear arsenal intact (còn nguyên). The guilt and stain (tội lỗi và vết nhơ) of the Ukraine war will stay with Russian politics for decades; rare is the country that profits from a lost war. The futility (sự vô ích) of the costs spent on a lost war, the human toll (thương vong nhân mạng), and the geopolitical decline (suy giảm vị thế địa chính trị) will define the course (xác định con đường) of Russia and Russian foreign policy for many years to come, and it will be very difficult to imagine a liberal Russia emerging after the horrors of this war.

Even if Putin loses his grip on Russia, the country is unlikely to emerge as a pro-Western democracy. It could split apart, especially in the North Caucasus. Or it could become a nuclear-armed military dictatorship. Policymakers would not be wrong to hope for a better Russia and for the time when a post-Putin Russia could be genuinely integrated into Europe; they should do what they can to enable this eventuality, even as they resist Putin’s war. They would be foolish, however, not to prepare for darker possibilities.

History has shown that it is immensely difficult to build a stable international order (trật tự quốc tế) with a revanchist, humiliated power near its center, especially one of the size and weight of Russia.

Bài trước: Không cấm bay được đâu