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trích dẫn hôm nay… is from pages 502-503 of the late Wesleyan University economic historian Stanley Lebergott’s great 1984 book, The Americans: An Economic Record (footnotes deleted; link added; brackets and ellipses original to Lebergott):
The “progressive deterioration (sự làm hư hỏng, làm giảm giá trị) in the value of money (giá trị của tiền) through history is not an accident (tai nạn, ngẫu nhiên), and has behind it two great driving forces,” wrote Keynes in 1924. One was the “superior political influence (ảnh hưởng chính trị) of the debtor class.” That force has been only mildly effective in the United States. Connecticut and Massachusetts experimented by printing paper money in the 1740s and Rhode Island by printing it in the 1790s. These represented the high point of debtor influence. Populism’s failure in the 1890s, and the limited “reflation” of the 1930s, showed that such forces have been weak in the United States.
The second force, said Keynes, was “the impecuniosity (sự túng thiếu, tình cảnh túng thiếu) of governments.” What is “raised by printing notes [i.e., money] is just as much taken from the public as is a beer duty or an income-tax…. In some countries it seems plausible to please and content the public by giving them, in return for the taxes they pay, finely engraved acknowledgements on water-marked paper.” Inflation as a “potent instrument of government extraction (bòn rút)” surfaced in 1968-69 when the federal government rapidly increased expenditure (chi tiêu) for both a war in Vietnam and a “war on poverty” at home. Over the next decade the voters revealed their desire for ever more programs of expenditure, welfare and/or defense, and an almost equal desire to pay no increased taxes for such programs. Inflation proved a way to reconcile (làm cho hài hòa) these conflicting (mâu thuẫn) desires.
Bài trước: Nền tảng của kinh tế thị trường
Tags: economics
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