Vì sao Silicon Valley Bank sụp đổ?

định trấn an nhà đầu tư mà lại tác dụng ngược (nhà đầu tư thêm bất an),

ban điều hành ngân hàng bán số trái phiếu trị giá 21 tỷ usd, chấp nhận mức lỗ 1,8 tỷ usd,

để bù lỗ, bđh ngân hàng định huy động vốn cổ phần từ công ty đầu tư mạo hiểm General Atlantic và bán trái phiếu chuyển đổi ra công chúng (phải hôm sau mới xong, khiến nhà đầu tư, khách hàng rút tiền hàng loạt, tới 42 tỷ usd cuối ngày 9/3, 25% số dư tiền gửi)...
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The failure of Silicon Valley Bank was caused by a run on the bank. The company was not, at least until clients started rushing for the exits, insolvent or even close to insolvent. But if the banking business is ultimately a confidence game, the game ended quickly.

The collapse may have been an unforced, self-inflicted error: The bank’s management chose to sell $21 billion of bonds at a $1.8 billion loss, in large part, it appears, because many of those bonds were yielding an average of only 1.79 percent at a time when interest rates had risen drastically and the bank was starting to look like an underperformer relative to its peers. Moody’s was considering downgrading its rating. The bank’s management — with the help of Goldman Sachs, its adviser — chose to raise new equity from the venture capital firm General Atlantic and also to sell a convertible bond to the public.

It isn’t clear if the bond sale or the fund-raising, at least initially, had been made under duress (sự câu thúc, sự cưỡng ép). It was meant to reassure investors. But it had the opposite effect: It so surprised the market that it led the bank’s very smart client base of venture capitalists to direct their portfolio clients to withdraw their deposits en masse.

The bank and its advisers may have also made a tactical mistake (lỗi kỹ thuật): The General Atlantic equity investment could have been completed overnight, but the bank’s management also chose to sell convertible preferred stock, which couldn’t be sold until the next day. That left time for investors — and, more important, clients — to start scratching their heads and sow doubt about the firm, leading to an exodus of deposits.

...underlying the failure was a demonstrable problem, one to keep an eye on for other banks: The company had invested its deposits in low-interest rate bonds that it held on its books on a long-term “hold-to-maturity” basis. That means that it did not have to mark-to-market those bonds until they were sold, leaving investors with a somewhat distorted view of its balance sheet. So long as a bank doesn’t need to sell “hold-to-maturity” assets to meet withdrawal requests, there is no problem. But if a bank has to sell at a loss, that’s when things get complicated.

Bài trước: Jes Staley bị kiện
Tags: bankfinance

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