Ốc không mang nổi mình ốc
Nga muốn nâng tầm ảnh hưởng ở châu Phi, mà khó lắm,
bán vũ khí mới được 115 triệu usd cho 54 nước ở châu lục này,
Since invading Ukraine, Russia has sought to increase the region’s share of its total global trade above the current 3.7%, with specific attention to increasing African primary commodity exports to Russia. However, African exports (xuất khẩu) to Russia still make up a tiny 0.4% of the region’s total exports. In addition, Russian foreign direct investments in Africa amount to about 1% of the total flow. These numbers are not what one would expect from an alleged geopolitical heavyweight that is supposedly about to remake the region’s alliance terrain.
While Moscow is a leading arms supplier (nhà cung cấp vũ khí hàng đầu) to a number of African states — a fact that is often cited a multiplier of its influence in the region — the actual numbers are inarguably underwhelming (không thể phủ nhận là quá ấn tượng). Earlier this year SIPRI, a Swedish tracker of conflicts and trade in arms, noted that Russia had increased its share of weapons supply to Africa to 26% of the regional market share. The report was greeted with the usual willfully ignorant shock and alarm. Yet the figure quickly loses its punch once one realizes that it represents less than $115m in flows to a region of 54 sovereign states (chủ quyền của đất nước). Arms sales in Africa simply aren’t what they used to be.
from Ken Opalo.