Còn trông chờ Mỹ ư
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không bảo vệ được Israel đâu...
The simple and unarguable truth (sự thật không thể chối cãi) is that for decades the US military has lacked the ability to quickly project conventional ground and air forces into the Middle East that would be able to successfully defend (bảo vệ thành công) Israel. This has been true for about 50 years.
The US Army and US Marine Corps combined now have an active force structure of just 39 maneuver brigades (lữ đoàn), of which only about 13 are combat ready. It would require many weeks to bring a portion of the remaining 26 active maneuver brigades to combat ready status. Achieving this would require cannibalization (tự cắt giảm) of about 25% of the remaining active units in order to bring the others to full strength. US reserve National Guard maneuver brigades would each require about five months for mobilization (huy động), retraining, and deployment (triển khai). These National Guard reserve units (đơn vị dự bị) are thus irrelevant to any Israeli rescue scenario (kịch bản giải cứu).
The ability of the US military to deploy forces over long distances has declined in the last 30 years because of a lack of investment in large specialized roll-on roll-off ships (tàu cuộn chuyên dụng loại lớn). Many of the existing US reserve merchant marine ships dedicated to military use are overage and have been poorly maintained. Based on the deployment times achieved during Operation Desert Storm (cơn bão), it is estimated that within about three weeks the US could project two light infantry (bộ binh) paratroop brigades into Israel by air, plus one Marine infantry brigade transferred by forward deployed USN amphibious ships and pre-loaded forward-based maritime ships. Given about nine weeks, the US would likely be able to field nine maneuver brigades in the Middle East consisting of three paratroop, three Marine, and three heavy armored brigades. Consequently, it would require about nine weeks for the US military to generate roughly 15% of the IDF’s ground force mobilizable order of battle. These US forces would only deploy about 10% of the number of armored fighting vehicles the IDF can field.
The USAF has a very limited number of combat aircraft currently deployed in Europe. With air-to-air refueling, it is estimated that these aircraft might be able to sustain the generation of about 90 sorties (các cuộc xuất kích) a day in support of Israel. But these few sorties, which only 14 I Israel Versus Anyone: A Military Net Assessment of the Middle East represent 5% of Israeli wartime capability, could only be generated if the host country where these aircraft are based were to allow them to be operated in support of Israel. In the past, this approval has not always been provided. Neither the USN nor USMC currently have any operational combat aircraft based on aircraft carriers or large amphibious ships (tàu đổ bộ) that are normally deployed in the Mediterranean within range of Israel.