Có thật sự vậy không?
Kissinger lấy ví dụ dân tàu chơi cờ vây còn người mỹ chơi cờ vua, nên china tính toán dài hạn hơn,
thật ra ko phải vậy đâu, một loạt ví dụ ở dưới là rõ...
...But isn’t it a little weird for an American author to make this argument in a book that’s explicitly based on the 2400-year-old history of ancient Greece? Americans don’t think the world was created by George Washington — like Graham Allison himself, they think quite often about stuff that happened in ancient times. In Americans’ minds, the U.S. is more analogous (tương tự) to a single Chinese dynasty, most of which lasted for a much shorter time than the U.S., and none of which has hit the 3-century mark for 1800 years.
|photo credit: the guardian|
In any case, though, it’s far from clear that Chinese leaders engage in more long-term thinking than American leaders do. There are plenty of examples to show this.
In the late 1700s, America’s founders (nhà lập quốc) were creating a constitutional system (hệ thống hiến pháp) that endures (tồn tại) to this day, and is broadly considered the longest-lived constitution in the world. Many of the legal and political concepts (khái niệm) the framers pioneered are now the basis of almost all rich modern nation-states. Shortly after that, Alexander Hamilton was creating a long-term economic plan (kế hoạch kinh tế dài hạn) that involved (bao gồm, liên quan tới) big infrastructure projects (các dự án xây dựng cơ sở hạ tầng lớn), infant-industry (công nghiệp non trẻ) policies, and a central bank, with an eye to dominating manufacturing industries. It’s important to realize how revolutionary (mang tính cách mạng) this was, as this was the very early days of the industrial revolution (cách mạng công nghiệp) and no one even know how important manufacturing (sản xuất) would eventually be! Hamilton saw it before almost anyone else did, and the policies he pioneered (đi tiên phong) are in some ways the basis of China’s current industrial policy.
What was China doing at that time? The Qing Dynasty (nhà Thanh) was at its height of wealth and power in the 1700s. But although it built plenty of palaces (cung điện) and stuff, it didn’t really modernize (hiện đại hóa) the canal system (hệ thống kênh), whose decline ended up hurting the Chinese economy. Its failure to collect taxes effectively weakened the government considerably. The empire turned inward, ignoring most opportunities for international trade and commerce. And most damningly, the Qing failed to see the potential of industrialization and modern technology. In a fateful (định mệnh) encounter with a British embassy in 1793, when presented with clocks, telescopes (kính thiên văn), modern weaponry (vũ khí hiện đại), and a number of other pieces of proto-industrial Western technology, the Qianlong emperor sniffed that he had no need of Britain’s manufactures. From that time until the 21st century, China was playing technological catch-up.
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